2. The interview with Joseph E. Shtiglits
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2. The interview with Joseph E. Shtiglits
The interview with Joseph E. Shtiglits, former vice-president of the World Bank, economic advisor to US President Clinton, winner of the Nobel prize in economy for 2001. Published in the Sunday supplement to the «El Pais» newspaper of June 23, 2002. Recently he wrote a book about the IMF under the title of «El malestar en la Globalizacion» («The Disease of Globalization» - approximate translation). Here are some parts of that interview (based on Russian translation).
- You write that while working in the Clinton administration you were surprised by the circumstance that many decisions in the White House, as well as the IMF, were often taken out of ideological and political considerations, rather than according to the requirements of economy?
– In a certain sense, I was not greatly surprised by what was happening in the White House. I was disturbed that ideology and politics played such a significant role in international economic organizations where professional economists are supposed to set the fashion. For example, research indicated that liberalizing financial market would result not in economic growth but in destabilization of economy. We knew that, it should not have been done according to the science of economics, yet the IMF kept trying to implement exactly this kind of liberalization. Its motives in doing so were purely ideological and political…
- When the reader comes to the end of your book, he might be puzzled with the following question: who is taking decisions which determine world events affecting the well-being of millions of people?
– According to my experience of working in the American government and the World Bank there is no single person who makes such decisions. This is a complex process involving many forces. Even the President of the USA is not able to influence many issues. He doesn’t even have the information necessary to do it. There are too many decisions to be made, one must also take into account the nature of information that he gets… Different groups try to control his incoming information, informing him only of what can persuade him to take a certain position favorable to them. Many people cannot understand that there is no such single man who controls the situation personally.
- OK, it is not a single person, not the President of the United States, but someone, some people do make decisions. Who are they?
– In my book I tried to clarify the fundamental role played in this process by major financial interests and transnational corporations. But at the same time, I would like to stress that there are other forces involved in this game. For example, the «Anniversary-2000» movement played a significant role in reducing the debt. The IMF resisted, but the civil movement turned out to be so strong that got the upper hand on that point. There are many economists inside the World Bank itself who are genuinely concerned with the problems of poverty and environment protection…
- You leave no doubts in your book about the US Treasury and the IMF having the real power. Is it they who determine policy?
– Yes, the IMF sets the macroeconomic and financial policy. Unfortunately, a country needs to get the IMF’s approval before it can receive help from the European Community or the World Bank. In this sense, the Fund’s power is enormous…
- In crisis situations in developing countries the US Treasury and the IMF deliberately gave recommendations which aggravated problems, as you firmly claim in your book, but which corresponded to the economic and ideological interests of developed countries. What does it mean from the moral point of view?
– This means that they used the crises in those countries to pursue their own interests…
- You tell that some heads of states sadly admitted to you that they had to follow the IMF’s tastes though its recommendations were clearly bad for their countries; that the IMF played the role of an international policeman who forced them to make destructive decisions.
– Quite so. They were afraid to get on the IMF’s black-lists. In that case they would not get any credits either in the Fund, or the WB, or the EC. And owing to low IMF assessment they wouldn’t be able to count on attracting private investments. Worse than that, they were afraid even to speak of their problems openly, fearing that such an openness in itself will be considered as impudence and confrontation by the IMF which will then punish them and revenge. It means that they considered any form open dialogue impossible.
- You think that the IMF is mistaken in refusing to take into account the opinion of the governments of the countries where it executes its policy. Is it just like you describe in your book: the Fund’s representatives arrive, in three or four days they suggest the country’s leadership to sign certain conditions [438] similar for all, and then accuse the this same leadership of corruption?
– They lay down a number of conditions…
- Could you tell us how the IMF functions? How is its economic policy defined?
– There is only one country in the IMF which has the veto right. It is the Treasury of the United States.