* *
Ford and Stalin. How to Live in Humaneness · перевод (English) · раздел 34 из 42
Перевод исходного произведения; точность перевода оценивается отдельно.
* *
Indeed J.V. Stalin knew that he gave much of his health to the victory in the Great Patriotic War. He knew that he went through his first (not serious according to their consequences) apoplexies actually not being out of control over the state and party matters. Indeed he knew that his surrounding - an internal party mafia - for several decades simply let no young Bolsheviks in, one of whom with the time could get into the swing of general party and state work and impose the highest party and state authority on himself, letting J.V. Stalin retire as any of the citizens of the USSR. That is why he used some means of screening of his true intentions from his closest surrounding that he had a right not to trust, justly seeing in them either executers of the will of the leader or viewless trimmers, but not initiative thinking creatively Bolsheviks, his comrades, servants of the ideal of Communism.
It would be a vile slander and absurdity to state that J.V. Stalin did nothing so that after his death the Bolsheviks’ work on the transfer to the true Communism - a society of the righteous common living of free people on a global scale - was continued and strengthened. But what he did does not get along with the dependant ideas of the communist crowd about what the true leader of the communists should do before passing away.
A crowd, consumptively non-initiatively disposed towards their leader, imaging the delegation of authority to the follower-successor in the light of a historically formed monarchy tradition:
· In one of its variants the leader while alive should appoint a successor, teach him and bring him up, let him into the different secrets of his work and then delegate his duties - this is the way the authority is delegated in the monarch dynasties, with the only difference that they prepare for that from babyhood only one elder son of the leader, not the stranger;
· The other variant is when after the death of the leader or after his resignation, «conclave» of the fellow-fighters chooses the next leader - as cardinals choose the Pope.
But here it is necessary to stress that in both variants of the succession of leadership not entire authority is passed, but only the duties [311] that are usually acclaimed by the rest of the society or by its large powerful part on the basis of the written laws and unwritten traditions. But once authority is delegated, every successor places on himself the concern and the responsibility for the work - according to his morally conditioned understanding and self-discipline.
If to put outside the brackets the accompanying historical circumstances, then all crushes in history monarchies (hereditary and non- hereditary dictatorships) failed only due to the only reason, common for all of them - placing the duty and authority upon himself for the work he is the head of, according to his duties, the successor of the leader turned out not to be ready for the full circle of the concern and the responsibility that correspond with the entire intrasocial power. Thereupon the error of the management accumulated in the actions of the succession of the leaders changing each other and then the system collapsed.
The core difference between the crowd-“elitism” and bolshevism is in the following: in the crowd-“elitism” for the deed actualization duties, acclaimed by more or less wide layers of society on the basis of the law or tradition, is significant and therefore primary. In Bolshevism initiative placing upon oneself the concern and the responsibility for work is significant and therefore primary, as for the duties, they are secondary in respect to this voluntarily chosen autocracy in the common work. The duties are formed and acclaimed by the rest of Bolsheviks depending on how well the candidate for the post of the leader suits the aims of Bolshevism.
Consequently in Bolshevism a man shouldn’t engineer himself in all cases to the formed structures of the duties and algorithmic of their functioning, but the structures of the duties, pretty much, if not completely, engineer according to the interpersonal delegation of the concern and the responsibility for the common work between the participants. This delegation is formed on the bases of the acquired by each of them skills and knowledge. That is why the architecture of the structures of the duties should be flexible enough and be purposely engineered by the participants for the possibilities of the specific people to answer their personal development and changes in the personal structure, that equally entails the change of the character of the delegation of the concern and the responsibility for the common work between the people.
In other words it means that J.V. Stalin could delegate his authority to the one he chose as a follower-successor or it could be taken over by his «fellow-fighters» - candidates for power, - which actually happened.
But somebody was to voluntarily lay the concern and the responsibility for work that J.V. Stalin served to, independently of the procedure of the delegation of authority by J.V. Stalin to someone else. By his actions J.V. Stalin could only create conditions for the successors to take upon themselves the concern and the responsibility for the Bolsheviks’ idea, not less than Stalin’s.
All this said about the delegation of authority in the form of concern and responsibility for work and about the delegation of duties and the difference between the real power and duties, J.V. Stalin himself experienced, partly knew from history and somehow understood it in his peculiar system of conceptions. Because in the period of 1945 - 1952 he actually created the conditions when his followers-successors could take upon themselves the concern and the responsibility for the Bolsheviks’ idea, not less than Stalin’s and accordingly could change, if necessary, the architectural structure of the duties and algorithmic of their functioning. He passed away only after creating all these conditions. [312]
Let’s start with the fact that the post-war period of the history of the Stalin’s USSR is characterized by the Hebrew (Jews indeed) commentators and non-Hebrew commentators that lost the perception of complicity to the fate of the simple people as a period when the politics of the «state anti-Semitism» was pursued. It is the time when many Hebrew public organizations [313] were shut down; it is the time of struggle against cosmopolitism and groveling before the West, against Zionism that affected many Hebrews and non-Hebrews. The exposure of the pseudonyms of the cultural workers that uncovered their true last names that in majority were Hebrewish. «Doctor’s Case» that preceded the elimination of J.V. Stalin by the scared «associates» and the rumors about the resettlement of the Hebrews to the Jewish autonomic region [314] at the Far East that was never realized due to the Stalin’s death.
But essentially it was a politics of the «state anti-Semitism» that was carried out only to suppress the rights and the freedoms of people on the basis of their Hebrewish ancestry. It was the first (after the victory of internazis in the state take-over of 1917) open [315] try of the state to suppress the activity of the consciously purposeful and spontaneously unconscious internazi in the Soviet society.
It was as effective as it was possible in terms of the historically formed at that time culture and Marxist sociology to single out internazi in the general flow of events of the past and present history of the humanity on the whole and particularly in Russia. It was as effective as it was possible for the society to comprehend such an interpretation of the Marxist and intercultural terminology. As effective as the people of the society and first of all administrators of the governmental authorities were self-disciplined in questions of abuse of their possibilities and staying away from the participation in the gregarious effects of the political activity of the crowd that live according to the traditions and thinks according to the authority [316]. It was as effective as the Hebrews were able to reveal in themselves and in others internazism so typical for their culture and in this or that way for each of them, as a consequence of the influence of the culture, since without the revealing of the essence of the internazism in the culture and in people, it is impossible to part with it and liberated from its power.
It was not the politics of the «state anti-Semitism», that was carried out only to suppress the rights and the freedoms of people on basis of their Hebrewish ancestry and giving others some privileges on the basis of the absence of the Hebrews among their ancestors.
It was the state measures of reducing pressure of the internazism which for decades after the state upheaval in 1917 had been suppressing the spirit of people with all its power of the Marxist ideology and state, at this abusing the power of the punitive bodies of special services. It suppressed the national spirit of all the nations of the USSR, but also the Hebrewish Diaspora, preventing the spiritual emancipation of the society and formation informal freedoms in it and sovereignty of people that is typically for the humanity.
Although the word «internazism» at that time was not introduced in the political vocabulary and in the culture of the society, but the words «Zionism», «cosmopolitism», «groveling before the West» in official Stalin’s propaganda were interpreted exactly according to the features of the demonstration of this global historical phenomenon, which in the terms of the IP (Internal-Predict) of the USSR is called internazism.
So under the term «Zionism» they saw not the aspiration of the Hebrews to settle in Palestine and create their state, but the exploitative ideology of the large Jewish international bourgeois, enslaving in the essence in respect to others, including Jews. Under the term «cosmopolitism» they saw not the concern of a man for the fates of the human beings and the Earth, but the refusal of the concern and the responsibility for the fates of the people of their homeland and other countries, that in fact made such kind of “cosmopolites” common to the local “elite” anti-national periphery of the «world backstage». The same is true about the «groveling before the West» [317].
But even these peculiarities of the interpretation of the sense of the mentioned words of Stalin’s propaganda are regarded by anti-Stalinists, internazis and the slaves of anti-Nazism as another demonstration of Stalin’s hypocrisy and ideological screen of anti-Hebrewish racism of Stalin’s regime. But it would be just and therefore better for them to address their claims not to J.V. Stalin but to the mentioned in one of the footnotes of Chapter 6.3 Yu. Larin, (M.A. Lurie) - the author of the book «Jews [318] and anti-Semitism in the USSR» and such like «researchers» and «enlighteners». He and others like him, seeing internazism through the phenomena that it could penetrate through and the form which it took, avoid and still do the true reasons and the algorithmic of the coming into existence of the so-called «anti-Semitism». This contributed and contributes to the anti-Hebrew racism remaining in society - which is the hostile attitude towards other people, emanating from the true or false supposition of belonging to Hebrews and being part of them. Such kind of anti-Hebrew racism was spread out due to the implementation by J.V. Stalin of the state measures on suppressing internazism, and put on a mask of the latter.
All that are afraid of the so-called «anti-Semitism» in all its manifestations should know:
The so-called «anti-Semitism» appears not where Hebrews are, but where the Bible doctrine of the enslavement of all is being implemented in the form of the tradition of taboo on the discussion of the essence of the «Jew problem» or where it is presented as a Providential good.
What you call «anti-Semitism» in its foundation has the righteous denial of the Bible internazism. Only under the pressure of internazism that you bear, or under the pressure of Nazism that is born by the national “elites” this tendency to freedom and humanism is being perverted and presented as anti-Hebrew racism, fruitless and cruelly antihuman [319] as any other racism, including yours - internazi.
The politics of the state suppression of internazism in the post-war period of the history of the Stalin’s Bolshevism was a background for the whole public and political life of the country. One of the important events of the public and political life of the Soviet society, that is forgotten by many contemporaries of those events now, was the discussions of different problems of life in the soviet society and the development of its culture that were published. These discussions are also referred to by the anti-Stalinists as demonstrations of Stalin’s hypocrisy that provoked the illusion of freedom of words and thoughts in the opposition to the regime to be openly expressed so that later cruelly to be done away with.
At this, critics of the post-war politics of Stalin’s Bolshevism prefer not to get into the essence of the opinions expressed during the discussion, in spite of the fact that they are the cores of those public discussions. The opinions stated by different people were the criteria that characterized the development of the culture of the comprehension of the world in the soviet society. The culture of the comprehension of the world in the depths of its subcultures represents what in many ways anticipates the further fates of the society. That is why anti-Stalinists, who did not get into the essence of these opinions stated during the discussions of that epoch, are being also hypocrites or show their narrow-mindedness, which is actually the same.
These discussions where the first manifestations of the cruel fight that took place between Bolshevism and local “elite” mafia periphery of the «world backstage» for the state power in the multinational Russian regional civilization.
One of the discussions of those years was devoted to the problems of the sociology on the whole, that nevertheless were viewed through the problematic of the development of the economical science as theoretical basis for managing the development of the national economy of the soviet society. Since everybody wants to eat, live comfortably, have healthy children, get an education, be well-to-do when old, etc. and this is provided exactly by the economical bases of the society, then the economical problematic is able to raise a wider interest than purely philosophical, that is considered by many to be remote from real problems of life by simple abstraction. [320] According to this understanding of the priority of the economical conditionality prevailing in society (under the pressure of the historical materialism and the cult of Marxism on the whole), J.V. Stalin himself drew the bottom-line of the discussion of the economical problems.
All what in his opinion was necessary and what he could say in that summery and assessment of the potentials for the further development of the socialism in the USSR and in the world was in 1952 published in the collection of the articles and answer letters to the participants of that discussion under the common name “The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”, which was many times cited here and mentioned in the above chapters and that we are specifically going to analyze in the next chapter. The last of the letters of J.V. Stalin inserted in this book is dated September 29, 1952. In a week 19th Congress of the ACP (B) (All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) was held and the party was renamed as CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). This abbreviation remained ambiguous. The history proved the competence of the following interpretation: Capitulator Party of the Self-liquidation of Socialism.
19th Congress took place in Moscow in October 5 - 14, 1952. There a new membership of the Central Party Committee was elected. To understand why the history proved such a competence of the abbreviation CPSU we need to turn to a not well-know episode of the work of the Central Committee that was elected at the XIX congress.
After the Congress held on October 16, a Central Committee plenary session took place. J.V. Stalin spoke at the plenary session. His speech was a surprise for the participants: the surprise was not that no one expected it, but its contents. This Stalin’s speech benumbed the plenary session.
There were two reasons for it:
· First, J.V. Stalin bluntly warned the plenary session participants about the fact that those who are regarded his closest faithful associates, and if necessary - successors, were ready for betrayal of justice, bourgeois degeneration and joining in a conspiracy with imperialism. Thus J.V. Stalin openly expressed his distrust to V. Molotov and A. Mikoyan.
· Secondly, J.V. Stalin reported to the Central Committee members, - what they could have guessed themselves: that he had already become old and tired, therefore soon the time would come when he wouldn’t be able to rule the country, hence they were to think about and elect in advance another person to be the ruling party Central Committee Secretary General.
One could content oneself with this information about J. Stalin’s speech and go on to the further consideration of the problems. But it’s better to turn to one of the plenary session participant’s evidence, otherwise someone could consider our conclusion concerning attitude of the participants of the plenary session a groundless slander.
K. Simonov, who was a famous and influential writer and poet, respected in the Soviet society for decades, - became a candidate member for C.P.S.U. Central Committee, elected by the 19th Congress. In his memoirs, which he recorded on a tape-recorder not long before his death, and which were deciphered and published under the name “With the Eyes of a Man of My Generation” after he had passed away, he reports about the plenary session held on October 16, 1952, the following:
«In the March 1953 record 1 I didn’t expatiate on the plenary session for many reasons. Nevertheless first I’ll cite the short recording of that time, and then I’ll decipher some points, to decipher which now, 27 years after, will be a less sin 2 than to consign them to oblivion.
Here is the record in the original form:
«Of course, I have no right to record everything what happened at the Central Committee plenary session 3, but I still want to record some details not touching upon the issues of the plenary session.
When the plenary session began precisely at the appointed time, everyone was in his place. And when Stalin together with the other Politburo members came out from the back door and approached the presidium table, the people gathered in the Sverdlov Hall applauded him. Stalin came in, his face being very serious and concentrated, and casting a quick glance at the hall he made a gesture with his hand - from his chest towards us. And in this gesture he expressed that he understands our feelings to him and that we should understand that this is a Central Committee plenary session, where we should work «bold type supplied by the authors».
One of the Central Committee members speaking from the rostrum said in the end of his speech that he was Stalin’s faithful disciple. Stalin, who had been listening to the speech very attentively sitting in the presidium behind speakers, shortly remarked: «We are all Lenin’s followers» [321].
In his speech talking about need for steadfastness and intrepidity Stalin began to speak about Lenin and the intrepidity he showed in 1918, about the incredibly hard situation of that time and how strong enemies were.
And what about Lenin? - Stalin asked. - And Lenin - reread, what he said and wrote then. He thundered in that incredibly hard situation, thundered, wasn’t afraid of anyone. Thundered.
Stalin repeated this word «Thundered!» [322] twice or thrice.
Then in connection with one of the questions [323] emerged at the plenary session talking about his duties Stalin said:
As far as I am entrusted with it, I am doing it. It doesn’t mean it’s just meant for me. I’m brought up in another way, - he said the last phrase in a very sharp way» (the italics is supplied by the authors in order to separate the diary record of 1953 given by K. Simonov from the memoirs of 1979).
So, what happened and what did I mean by that short record made in 1953? I’ll try to remember and explain in the way I can.
(…)
I don’t want to take a sin upon my soul and try to recollect the details of the plenary session, which I remembered but didn’t record. I’ll just talk about what is really etched in my mind, what is a hard and even tragic recollection [324].
I think, the plenary session lasted for 2 hours or a bit more time, from which Stalin’s speech took half an hour and Molotov’s and Mikoyan’s speeches and elections of the Central Committee executive office in the end of the plenary session took the rest of the time. As far as I remember while Stalin was speaking Malenkov presided over the plenary session, the rest of the time Stalin himself presided over it. Almost after the beginning Malenkov gave Stalin the floor, and the latter walking behind the presidium table descended to the rostrum, which was several stairs lower than the table, in the middle as respects to it. From the beginning to the end he was talking in a harsh way without any humor, there were no sheets of paper in front of him [325]. During his speech he intently, tenaciously and somehow severely peered into the hall, as though he tried to penetrate into the thoughts of the people who were sitting in front and behind of him. The tone of his speech, the way he was speaking grasping the hall with his eyes, - everything benumbed the sitting, I also experienced that torpor. The main idea of his speech (if not textually, then according to the train of thought) was that he was old, and the time was coming when others would have to continue what he had been doing, that the situation in the world was hard and the struggle with the capitalist camp would be very difficult, and that is the most dangerous in that struggle was to waver, take fright, retreat, capitulate. This was the main idea he wanted not only to express, but also to inculcate into the present [326], which in its turn was connected with the theme of his own old age and probable departure.
All this was said in a tough and at times more than tough, almost fierce way. Probably in some points his speech included elements of game and account, but still one could feel true alarm [327] not without tragic hidden motive. It was in connection with danger of concessions, fear and capitulation, that Stalin appealed to Lenin in the phrases, which I have already quoted in my record of that time «the one of 1953, with which we began citing K. Simonov’s memoirs». Now, in fact, the speech concerned Stalin himself, who could leave, and those who could stay after his departure. But he wasn’t talking about himself; instead he was talking about Lenin and his intrepidity in the face of any conditions.
The main peculiarity of Stalin’s speech was that he didn’t consider it necessary to talk about courage or fear, resolution or defeatism. Everything he said about it he connected with two certain members of the Politburo, who were sitting in the same hall two meters behind him. As for me, I never expected to hear about these two people something Stalin was talking about them.
First he assailed Molotov with all these accusations and suspicions, accusations of unfaithfulness, suspicions of cowardice, defeatism. It was so unexpected, that fist I just couldn’t believe my ears, I thought I had misheard or misunderstood. But it proved to be just so. From Stalin’s speech it was evident that the most suspicious man who was capable of defeatism, and the most dangerous one for Stalin that evening, that plenary session was nobody else, but Molotov. He was talking about Molotov grimly for a long time. He gave some examples (which I don’t remember) of Molotov’s erroneous actions [328] mainly connected with the time when Stalin had been on leave, and Molotov had deputized for him solving some problems incorrectly, which he had had to solve in another way. I don’t remember what the problems were, probably partly for the reason that Stalin spoke to the audience, which was conversant with the political cobweb connected with the problems better than me. I didn’t always understand what he was talking about. Another reason for it could be the fact that his accusations were somehow reserved, vague and dim, at least I perceived it in that way.
I never understood what was Molotov’s fault. I just understood that Stalin accused him of a number of actions he had done in the after-war period. Stalin accused him in such a towering temper, which seemed to be connected with a direct danger for Molotov, with a direct threat to make final conclusions, which could be quite expected from Stalin, as the past proved. In fact, the main part of his speech, all the accusations of cowardice and defeatism, and the appeal to Lenin’s courage and rigidity Stalin connected with Molotov’s figure: he accused him of all the sins, which could not take place in the party, if the time had its effect and Stalin would no more be the leader of the party [329].
For all Stalin’s rage, which sometimes smacked of incontinence, in what he said there was the iron structure peculiar to him. The same structure was also present in the next part of his speech dedicated to Mikoyan, which was shorter, but more angry and disrespectful [330].
It was dreadfully silent in the hall. I didn’t look back at my neighbors. But I saw all the four Politburo members sitting behind Stalin, who stood at the rostrum and spoke. I saw all of them having hardened, strained, motionless faces. They as well as we didn’t know where and when Stalin would stop, whether after Molotov and Mikoyan he would pass on somebody else. They didn’t know what they were to hear about others or probably about themselves. Molotov’s and Mikoyan’s faces were white and lifeless. Their faces still were white and lifeless when Stalin finished, came back and sat at the table, and they - first Molotov and then Mikoyan - one after the other descended to the rostrum. There - Molotov for a longer time, and Mikoyan for a shorter one - they tried to explain their actions and conduct to Stalin, justify themselves, tell him that they had been neither cowards nor defeatists and wouldn’t fear new collisions with the capitalist camp and wouldn’t capitulate [331].
After the cruelty and rage, which sounded in Stalin’s speech when he spoke about them, both the speakers seemed to be defendants taking the final plea and pleading no guilty in all the points, but could hardly hope for a change in their fate, which had been determined by Stalin. I had a strange feeling, which I remembered then: they were speaking and it seemed to me that they were not the people whom I had seen so often not very far from me, but white masks put on their faces and which looked very much alike with the faces, and at the same time they were somehow absolutely different, lifeless [332]. I don’t know whether I’ve expressed myself precisely enough, but I had this very feeling, and I don’t exaggerate it antedate.
I don’t know why Stalin in his final speech at the Central Committee plenary session chose Molotov and Mikoyan as the two main objects for distrust. It was doubtless that he obviously wanted to compromise both of them, humble them, bereave ones of the most important historic figures after him of aureole. He wanted to make them small; especially he wanted to humble Molotov, to bring to nothing the aureole Molotov had [333], in spite of the fact that in the recent years he had been removed from the work to a great extent, in spite of the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already run by Vyshinsky, in spite of the fact that his wife was in prison [334], - in spite of all this many-many people said or remembered Molotov’s name right after Stalin’s one. This was probably what Stalin didn’t want. This he tried to bring home to everyone who had gathered at the plenary session, to all the old and young Central Committee members and candidates, to all the old and new members of the Central Committee executive office, which was to be elected yet. But for some reason he didn’t want Molotov to stay after him the first figure in the state and the party. And his speech excluded such an opportunity.
(…)
And there’s one more thing. I don’t remember exactly whether in this speech before giving the floor to Molotov and Mikoyan, or after it, in another his speech, which preceded the elections of the Central Committee executive office - I’m even afraid to affirm that the second speech took place, probably everything was said in different parts of the first one, - standing at the rostrum and looking into the hall Stalin began talking about his old age and that he was unable to fulfill all the duties he is entrusted with. He could act as the chairman of Council of Ministers; he could also hold Politburo sessions as he had used to; but he was unable to hold Central Committee sessions as the Secretary General. That’s why he asked to exempt him from the latter post, comply with his request. I reproduce it almost in the way it was said. But this is not the matter of the words he said. Saying them Stalin was looking into the hall, and behind him the Politburo was sitting, and Malenkov, who hold the session while Stalin was speaking, was standing at the table. And I saw a horrible expression at Malenkov’s face - that was not fright, but such an expression that showed that the man had realized the mortal danger, which threatened everyone, and which the others hadn’t realized yet: one mustn’t agree with comrade Stalin’s request, one mustn’t let him resign from the last of his three commissions. Malenkov’s face, his gestures, his significantly raised hands were an outspoken entreaty to all the present to refuse Stalin’s request immediately and decidedly [335]. And then the words: «No, please, stay!» (or something like that), which sounded behind Stalin, were drowned by the buzz in the hall: «No! No! Please, stay! We beg you to withdraw your request!» I don’t presume to cite all the words and cries, but on the whole the people understood something, and probably, most of them had understood it before I did. In the first moment [336] all this seemed quite natural to me: Stalin would be the politburo chairman and the chairman of the council of Ministers, and somebody else would act as the Central Committee Secretary General, the way it had been under Lenin [337]. But what I didn’t understand at once, many others understood immediately or almost immediately, and Malenkov, who was responsible more than others as he was presiding at that moment, realized right away that Stalin wasn’t going to resign the post of the Secretary General, that it was a test, reconnaissance of the attitude to the problem posed by him - whether they, the sitting behind him in the presidium and in front of him in the hall, were ready to let him, Stalin, resign the post of the Secretary General because he was old, tired and wasn’t able to fulfill this third duty of his.
When the hall began buzzing and crying that Stalin had to stay at the post of the Secretary General and hold the Central Committee Office, Malenkov’s face (I remember it very well) was the face of a man who had escaped a direct, real mortal danger, as this was he who had made the summary report at the party Congress, who had been holding almost all the Central Committee Office sessions and who was presiding at this plenary session. This was he who in case of another reaction to Stalin’s request would have been the only candidate [338] to the third post of comrade Stalin, who said he wanted to resign from it because of his old age and fatigue. And in case Stalin had felt that behind his back or in front of his eyes there were people who could agree with his request, I think, Malenkov would have been the first to pay for it with his life. It’s difficult to imagine what it would come to» (K. Simonov, «With the Eyes of a Man of My Generation. Reflections on J. Stalin», Moscow, News Agencies publishers, 1988, p. 239 - 246 minus the parts of the text, the sites of which are marked with omission points in brackets).
In fact, this episode shows that J. Stalin’s initiative - to delegate his commission of the party Central Committee Secretary General to a successor on the basis of open nomination of candidates, their discussions at the plenary session and election of a new Secretary General in a quite democratic way,- was carelessly and irresponsibly rejected by the Central Committee members, who had been elected at the 19th Congress, and who let one of the state machine leaders - G. Malenkov, who was presiding the plenary session, - push themselves around. This is uncontradicted evidence that even 13 years after that crowd-“elitist” 18th Congress, the crowd-“elitist” character of the party and its Central Committee members still remained [339]. Though as K. Simonov wrote in 1953, he understood that the Congress and the plenary session were summoned for work and not for their participants to express their feelings to J.V. Stalin (this confession of his we set off in bold type when citing).
Anti-Stalinists, whose impudent resourcefulness of their “astuteness” and “intellectual might” has no limits, affirm in their commentaries to this episode (as well as K. Simonov) that the plenary session presidium members sitting behind J.V. Stalin and the Central Committee members sitting in the hall suspected at once that guileful Stalin was looking for the next «party favorite», who could take his place with time - the place of the «mundane god» (i.e. as if immortal) - the post of the leader of the state and the party. And what’s more, anti-Stalinists affirm that Stalin was looking for that «party favorite» in order to begin a new wave of «unjustified» repressions.
We believe that everything was simpler: J.V. Stalin was the only Bolshevik in the hall, the rest were cowardly, self-seeking, and thus shameless and careless frightened time-servers, lackeys by their psychology, who after the Great October Socialistic Revolution formed a new haughty class and considered themselves the true “elite” of the soviet society.
This lackey-careless attitude to the Motherland with claims on haughtiness is not only seen in K. Simonov’s description of the plenary session, but is also obvious from his personal attitude to life during the post-Stalin period. In fact we have cited such a huge extract in order make our assertion not unfounded, and for readers to feel the spirit of the frightened party-nomenclature servility conveyed by K. Simonov, which became apparent at that plenary session.
What J.V. Stalin thought about the results of the plenary session only he and God could know. The intra-system mafia members frightened of Stalin’s first illegitimate (as they thought) attempt to delegate his commission of the Central Committee Secretary General, decided not to wait for further initiative demonstration of Stalin and the party in this course and «eliminated» J.V. Stalin in less than half a year, carrying out «coup d’etat».
But as a result of such a conduct of the plenary session - of its every participant-bolshevism deserted the CPSU organizational structures during the next decade, the way it had deserted the hierarchy structures of the Russian Orthodox biblical church before.
Bolshevism really deserted the CPSU organizational structures, but didn’t disappear from the society. And it won’t appear in the organizational structures of any other party, construction organizational principles of which prevent personal development of a man.
J. Stalin’s speech at the Central Committee plenary session in October 1952 was published neither when he was alive, nor after his death. Due to this fact in many respects the myth about J. Stalin’s dictatorial absolute power and about his thirst for power for the sake of power could exist. Someone may think that J.V. Stalin didn’t want to publish his speech himself. But such a supposition would mean that J.V. Stalin was a defeatist, coward himself, i.e. it’s controversial to K. Simonov’s evidence concerning the events at the plenary session.
Many things indicate that during all his activity as the party and the state leader J.V. Stalin was surrounded by the system mafia, which used his name and Socialism and Communism slogans as a cover for its self-seeking activity [340]. This situation still remained in 1952, that’s why the speech without any prepared text delivered at the Central Committee plenary session was unexpected for the State machinery and the «guardians» present at it. This speech was nearly the only opportunity for J.V. Stalin to run the informational blockade and let the rest of the society [341] know (through the Central Committee members and candidates) his true opinion, which he expressed directly and not with the help of hints or by implication.
But as for opportunities to publish his speeches, there existed a multilevel system of self-censorship of the crowd-“elitist” society: from direct official bans and direct collusion of the «world backstage» periphery to the pressure upon the minds of individuals and gregarious effects begotten in the society by the cult of Marxism and cult of J.V. Stalin’s personality, owing to which false ideas about him were developed. J.V. Stalin had no power over this multilevel censorship system, thus he had to adapt himself to it and evade it, as well as all other ones in his public activity.
The difference in this timeserving between J.V. Stalin and the majority of other time-servers to the system was in the fact that J.V. Stalin adapted himself to it directing his efforts to the strategy of transformation of the global civilization life on the basis of the ideals of the righteous liberal society - communism. And the majority of time-servers pursued their selfish ends of the present day and near-term outlook: their minimum aims were to survive in the system and the maximum ones - to join to the system “elite” by way of repressing other people’s lives [342].
The story concerning the cessation of the edition of his collected works also confirms the fact that J.V. Stalin had no opportunity to be published. From 1941 through 1951 the first 13 volumes including his books, articles and speeches up to 1934 inclusive were published. But the edition of the 14th - 16th volumes took so much time that it can be considered that edition of J.V. Stalin’s collected works was actually ceased in 1951 - when the supposedly «all-powerful dictator» was still alive. There were no announcements about the cessation of the editions of the works of the soviet people leader. There was just an inexplicable delay in the edition of the regular volumes of the subscription publication [343]. The only explanation of the delay is that the work at the edition was ceased by retardation and corrective action as though to improve it [344].
J.V. Stalin impeded the «world backstage», because he was an authoritative politician-Bolshevik who acted conceptually beginning from the after-war years [345]. After the Great Patriotic War the course of political life in the USSR acquired a stable trend toward irreversible liberation from the power of the «world backstage» internazism. Thus the «world backstage» had to begin curbing the USSR and solving the problem of minimization of the damage caused by J. Stalin’s bolshevist activity during several decades. One more hindrance for the «world backstage» to carry out its political scenarios would be further publication of his works, which were to be included into the 14th - 16th volumes of the collected works. They could bring Stalin’s view of the flow of events in 1934 - 1952 home to contemporaries and descendants in a concentrated form [346]. Publication of J. Stalin’s speeches, articles and letters referring to these years would have essentially impeded and even made neo-Trotskyite policy of N. Khrushchev’s regime impossible, in case the edition had been published in 1951 - 1953 and included 14th - 16th volumes of the collected works.
Correspondingly, having taken the decision to annihilate J. Stalin [347], the «world backstage» gave the instruction to slow down the edition of his works, having assumed that if it had established under its control a new regime in the USSR after his removal, the crowd wouldn’t have dared to demand to continue edition of his collected works. They believed that as far as the crowd would have been conceptually powerless, it wouldn’t have been able to assure the continuation of Stalin’s political course. Indeed it happened so: the composed type of the 14th - 16th volumes and sample copies were destroyed when the new N. Khrushchev’s psycho-Trotskyist anti-Bolshevist regime came to power in the USSR. And as it’s well known the question of continuation of edition of J. Stalin’s works never arose at plenary sessions and Congresses of the defeatist party of Socialism self-destruction, and was never raised by the broad «masses» [348]: in the USSR only «dissidents» of probourgeois-individualistic trend belonging to the class of grovellers to the West were active.
That’s why nothing really says that in 1952 omitting the hierarchical multilevel self-censorship of crowd-“elitism”, which was beyond his control, J.V. Stalin could say directly to the society through the USSR mass media and scientific press what he thought. Nothing really says he could give instructions to publish his speech at the October Central Committee plenary session or any other one, which would overstep the limits of the society’s capacity for perceiving its meaning adequately [349]. Discussions concerning different problems, which were held in the press during after-war years, letters, which were addressed to the Central Committee, to the Government and to his name, gave a good idea of the society’s worldview and ideology, of what it could accept and understand, and what it would reject taking no trouble to re-comprehend the life and the said. This is clearly seen in the “The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”.
Judging from the reconstruction of the algorithmic model of the soviet society’s collective mentality of that time (including the analyses of the contemporaries’ evidences), only his single works and speeches could escape the censorship (which was beyond J. Stalin’s control) in the press and in other mass media. These works and speeches were to be done in such a linguistic style, that even formally according to the Marxism linguistic culture dominating in the USSR, they were not apprehended as a danger by the State machinery mafia. And even if the «world backstage» could understand the danger of the said to its policy, its periphery just had no time to respond to separate «leakages» of conceptually alien information (for it) into the society.
In such conditions succession of the Bolshevism conceptual power was ensured: “Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.” is J. Stalin’s report about achievements during his leadership of the party and the state; it’s a report about unsolved problems and a farewell speech to Bolsheviks. These collected works were published in 1952 as a separate edition.
And though after J. Stalin’s death his works were withdrawn from library stocks of common access, and from school and college curricula of philosophical and social sciences, still copies of the small brochure outlived Khrushchevism and the depression on the shelves of family libraries and were called for by successors-continuers, who belonged to new generations of Bolsheviks.
«Stalin hasn’t become a thing of the past, he has dissolved in our future» [350] - however sad it may be for many people, who are lackeys at heart, even if they pretend to be slave-owners and masters.