6.3. New Line of the «World Backstage»: Socialism at an Individual Country
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6.3. New Line of the «World Backstage»: Socialism at an Individual Country
Such actions of L.D. Bronstein and politically myopic left-wing social-revolutionaries considered within Russia at first sight seem hysterically-senseless. But if we consider the situation in global scale, this is not so by far. Brest peace treaty slowed down forcing of revolutionary situation in Germany and Austro-Hungary. Due to its influence on the course of events [217], revolutions in these countries under slogans of socialism started, but as Marxian internazi revolutions they failed; they created multitude of bourgeois republics and Yugoslavian monarchy out of two Central European monarchies.
In Russia by spring of 1918 aversion to the new power and sabotage of its undertakings by the part of population (first of all, by the representatives of former ruling classes and variegated «middle class») began to develop into Civil War. This put a question before the «world backstage», which it should support in the Civil War: either Marxian Soviet power, which developed during the revolution (even though contaminated with Bolshevism), or counter-revolution?
The victory of counter-revolution would inevitably result in firm establishment of nazi fascist regime in Russia (the history of Germany confirmed this later on). Though the «world backstage» had time to give Germany its protege as the Fuhrer, curing Germany from fascism was the waste of time in the global project of replacement of capitalism with different social system with the lower level of intrasocial tension and more harmonious relations between society and biosphere. But it is quite difficult to promote the protege for the position of Fuhrer under conditions of Civil War. And in case of the counter-revolution’s victory, multinational “elitist” imperial Nazism would incinerate not only the hateful Bolsheviks, misinterpreters of Marxism, but also the staff of professional Internazi revolutionaries. This would make the project of «world socialist revolution» in 20th century unrealizable. Therefore the «world backstage» decided to assist the Internazi Marxian power (though infected with multinational Bolshevism) in winning the victory in the Civil War, planning to solve the problem of Bolshevism suppression later on depending on circumstances.
The «world backstage» exercises its power by means different from those used by the rulers of the states and which are perceived by the men of the crowd as the means of execution of power in the life of the society. The governments issue the laws that concern all citizens (subjects), and directives that are addressed to the chiefs of certain state structures personally, whereas the «world backstage» participates, through its periphery in the society, in the activity of State machinery and social institutions, by either supporting their independent activities or by sabotaging them, but supporting at the same time other activities, activities of other structures both within the society and in other countries.
This power is executed on the basis of moulding the worldview of certain groups within the crowd-“elitist” society in a pre-emptive (anticipatory) manner. Due to the worldview moulded in this way whole social groups and classes act as if on their own accord but in a manner which is necessary for the «world backstage». This allows getting by with a minimal number of non-documentary directives (this is a sort of «pre-telephone right» existing from times immemorial). In each country those directives are addressed specifically to a very narrow circle of the «world backstage’s» periphery co-coordinators who are initiated into its activities. [218]
In accordance with this customary practice «world backstage» permitted the bourgeois regimes of Europe and America with Japan ’s complicity to start an intervention into Soviet Russia in order to split and colonize it with support lent by local counter-revolutionary forces.
But as the global history studies on the Civil War and intervention indicate, counter-revolution was being defeated on the battlefield because it was being let down by its foreign allies. Under the pressure of their internal movements who put forward slogans like «Keep your hands off Soviet Russia!» military deliveries were being called off shortly before decisive battles. [219] Admiral A. Kolchak, (who was the potential head of the multinational “elitist” imperial Nazism if the counter-revolution had got the upper hand), was betrayed by the interventionists following a direct order from their masonry superiors. He was handed over to the revolutionary authorities that did not hesitate in doing away with him quickly.
The Civil War’s last front in Russia was actually the Crimean front fought against baron P. Vrangel. M. Frunze gave his word of honor to preserve the life of those who would yield themselves prisoner. After P.Vrangel fled abroad the Crimean formation stopped resisting and surrendered in an organized way. Immediately after that M. Frunze by order of the high command was transferred to a new appointment. In his absence the internazis (it was exactly internazis who organized that military crime: Sklyansky, Zalkind (Zemlyachka), Bella Kun) killed 50,000 imprisoned White army officers in the Crimea. They broke the promises of preserving the life of prisoners of war thereby depriving Bolsheviks of potential managerial personnel whose effort would be directed to the nation’s benefit. [220] This incident is nothing exceptional. It is among the last in a whole series of similar incidents that took place in the course of the Civil war. In the course of war mass destruction, in some places amounting to complete destruction, of the former ruling “elite’s” representatives together with their families (including children) was a customary phenomenon. The victims of such massacres engaged in no anti-Soviet activities whatsoever. Along with that there were so many Hebrews among the VChK’s (National Emergency and Security Committee) executive staff, both in central and peripheral divisions (especially in the Ukraine), that the VChK of the time could be considered as a prototype of Hitler’s Gestapo only in its Hebrewish variant.
Such purposeful policy of eliminating the former ruling “elite’s” representatives which the internazi revolutionaries executed in the course of revolution and the Civil War resulted in the Hebrews’ having an overwhelming majority in the party and government bodies and in the mass media. This has a twofold explanation. First, it was an effect of the internazi’s personnel policy proper: promoting their own kin to key posts. Second, it resulted from the fact that at the end of the 19th century it was the Hebrews who became the best-educated part of the diverse people populating the Russian empire. They were ahead of all other ethnic groups according to statistics on education [221], and working in government bodies required a certain minimal educational level that the rest of the country’s population did not possess.
Yet in the very first years of peaceful life the «world backstage» and its RSFSR-USSR local representatives discovered the fact that most workers and peasants were loyal to the Soviet regime and many of them, especially young people, actively supported it on their own accord. [222] At the same time there was a growth in a certain phenomenon which internazis call anti-Semitism occurring throughout the entire society. [223] Under the social conditions existing at the time individuals like L. Bronstein (Trotsky), L. Rosenfeld (Kamenev), G. Apfelbaum (Zinovyev) and others of their kinship - at the time the cult leaders of the revolution and the «working people» who have won the Civil War - could not personify state power during the long period of building a new social order which then lay yet ahead. [224]
One should also understand that there is one kind of attitude to a revolution and the new power which follows in its wake if the revolution takes place while an imperialist war is going on and while everyone is tired of that war (except the “elite” who make fortunes on it). But there is a completely different attitude to a revolution if the new power arises as a result of a victory won by an aggressor who has started a «revolutionary fight for the sake of liberating fellow workers of another country from the yoke of capital» while those workers themselves have not yet become inspired with the thought of a revolution and a new power. [225] It is equally so if the new power arises through a coup d’etat organized in a country living a peaceful life. [226] Psychic Trotskyites and Marxists in the USSR did not regard those circumstances of great political momentum [227] as a political reality. [228]
Besides, while Russia fought the Civil War the revolutionary situation in European countries came to naught.
Due to these circumstances the «world backstage» had to agree with V. Lenin’s point of view: first establish socialism in a separate individual country, then transition to socialism in all other countries. V. Lenin expressed this point of view in as early as 1915. Among the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) top officials this point of view was shared by J. Stalin.
As noted by some biographers of J. Stalin, in the pre-Revolutionary and the early post-revolutionary years he was among the last to join the (party) majority that had already been formed before. This defined the way he made his party career. His works were written in a language befitting common people (see his Collected works). On the one hand, it made them easily accessible for the understanding of the common working people who were semiliterate and poorly educated. On the other hand, it convinced the intelligentsia who took up the ruling role in the party of J. Stalin’s own illiteracy because he seemed not to be able of mastering that «highly scientific» argot which was used by the party intelligentsia in their oral and written word and which the common people could not understand (e.g., immanent, permanent, fideism, gnoseology and similar words used in the literature of Marxist intelligentsia). Therefore for party leaders of Trotsky’s type Stalin was neither an outstanding party philosopher, economist and publicist writer [229] nor an outstanding orator capable of enticing the crowd towards the feats of revolution by word of mouth. The intelligentsia leaders and their supporters believed him to be an ill-bred (having no good manners), rude, poorly educated (a half-educated seminarian [230]), lazy (has written nothing during his last exile) man and therefore a man incapable of thinking independently.
This created a false impression that J.V. Stalin could be controlled by cleverer and better-educated leaders even if he did become the top party executive. That is why Stalin’s promotions to higher and higher levels of power inside the party produced no objection or opposition of the «world backstage».
Besides, J.V. Stalin was a member of a national minority like the majority of revolution leaders, namely, a Georgian, which seemed to guarantee that he would suppress any threat of «Great Russian» nationalism or Nazism.
All those factors resulted in that the «world backstage» found it plausible to entrust the task of personifying the success of socialism in a separate individual country to J. Stalin.
Bolsheviks, on their part, were also pondering who was to succeed and continue their cause as V. Lenin’s illness resulting from his injury [231] was deteriorating and making him less and less capable of leading the party and the state.
In this connection we shall turn to a document known as «The address to the convention» which is reported by the CPSU’s historic tradition as having been written down from V. Lenin’s words by several of his secretaries and at different times between December 1922 and January 1923.
The letter concerns the ways to avoid a party split in future and to ensure the Central Committee’s stability through formal means but not through achieving a unity of opinions on all the issues of party activity, this unity being based on the common methodology of cognition and world understanding shared by the party members. [232]
«I think that the most important people as far as this kind of stability is concerned are such CC [233] members as Stalin and Trotsky. The terms they are on in my opinion comprise the greater half of the danger posed by that kind of split which could be avoided. In my judgment it can be avoided through increasing the number of CC members up to 50 or 100 people among other things. [234]
Having taken the post of general secretary Comrade Stalin has concentrated in his hands a power of limitless authority, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use that power with enough caution or not. On the other hand, comrade Trotsky is distinguished not only by his outstanding abilities [235], as his opposition to the CC in regard to the issue of NKPS [236] has demonstrated. [237] Personally he seems to be the most able man in the current CC, yet he carries it too far with his self-confidence and caring too much for the purely administrative side of our cause.
The above-mentioned two qualities of the two outstanding leaders in our current CC can accidentally lead to a split, and if our party does not take measures to counter it, the split can occur unexpectedly.
I shall not speak any more about the personal qualities of other CC members. I should only like to remind you that the incident with Zinovyev and Kamenev was of course caused not by chance, yet they personally can be hardly blamed for it, just like Trotsky can be hardly blamed for his non-bolshevism» (V. Lenin, Collected works, issue 5, volume 45, the notes of December 24, 1922 continued, dictated by V. Lenin on December 25, 1922).
J. Stalin’s qualities are described further in the addition to the notes of December 25, 1922. This is what was written down by another secretary of V. Lenin, L. Fotiyeva (1881 - 1975) on January 4, 1923:
«Stalin is too rude, and this drawback which is tolerable among ourselves, the communists, becomes intolerable for a man in the office of the general secretary. That is why I suggest the comrades to think of a way to remove Stalin from this post and appoint a different man to it. In all the other respects this man should differ from comrade Stalin in only one way - having the advantage of being more tolerable, loyal, polite and attentive towards comrades, less whimsical, etc. This circumstance might seem to be trivial. But I think that in respect to avoiding a split and to what I said above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky this is not trivial or this is a trifle which could prove to be decisive».
Psychic Trotskyite writers have commented upon the “Address to the convention” by V. Lenin over and over again, making special emphasis on the addition to the address of January 4, 1923. They implied that it contained a Lenin’s warning that nobody listened to. Yet almost the only thing that escaped their understanding is exactly what V. Lenin really warned Bolsheviks from, as well as the fact that in this letter V. Lenin actually recommends J.V. Stalin to the party of Bolsheviks as his successor.
In order to understand what V. Lenin really warned the party from in his «Address to the convention» let us consider the testimonial V. Lenin gave to the members of ACP (B) Central Committee unbiased by turbulent emotions. V. Lenin openly describes all the candidates for the post of party leader (no matter what this post is called) apart from J.V. Stalin as non-Bolsheviks (Trotsky), as people unreliable in business (Kamenev, Zinovyev, Trotsky whom V. Lenin called «little Judas» in one of his works), as bureaucrats who can forget about the true cause carried away by administrative formalism (Trotsky, Buharin [238], Pyatakov [239]).
Thus, only J.V. Stalin remains. He has already concentrated in his hands an enormous power on the post of the general secretary [240]which speaks of his professional qualities as an administrator, of his ability to maintain a certain balance between form (administrative issues) and content (i.e. the cause itself) and of his capabilities as a leader. Yet along with that he is sometimes rude, intolerant, capricious.
Given the testimonies of all the other «leaders» the addition to the «Address» of January 4, 1923 is nothing but empty rhetoric: «We should have appointed somebody else instead of Stalin: someone equal to Stalin professionally but who would not be so rude and intolerant. Do you know someone like that? - I don’t». And at the same time this is a hint to Stalin: «Learn to be tolerant, my dear comrade, or it will cost you your head notwithstanding your good professional qualities. You will end the same way as I did: they will destroy you before you will be able to finish our cause. You see for yourself, there are no bolshevist people capable of being in charge among the party «leaders»… yet we must continue with the cause of bolshevism, otherwise masons and empty talkers from among intelligentsia carried along by them will walk all over the common people».
Following these meditations let us comment in greater detail the following phrase of V. Lenin: «the October incident [241] with Zinovyev and Kamenev was of course caused not by chance, yet they personally can be hardly blamed for it, just like Trotsky can be hardly blamed for his non-bolshevism»
The way V. Lenin characterized L.Rosenfeld (Kamenev), G. Apfelbaum (Zinovyev) and L. Bronstein (Trotsky) leads us to compare it with the legal status of slaves in a slave-owning society:
A slave cannot be held responsible for anything by the society of free people. For any damage inflicted by a slave his owner is held responsible. And only the owner has a right of punishing the slave in a way he himself chooses. Nobody from among the free people has a right to impede him in executing that right. [242]
Therefore the testimonial he gave to Bronstein, Rosenfeld, Apfelbaum is synonymous to a definition given to a slave’s legal status, simply in a different wording. Taking this into account and taking into account the knowledge we now have of that era, the above-mentioned testimonial given to that «trio» by V. Lenin can be only understood as a hint that the party «leaders» he mentions are actually puppets, slaves of masonry masters, executive periphery of the «world backstage». And one should not think that this conclusion is a far-fetched one while what V. Lenin meant is something completely different: V. Lenin was a lawyer, he knew legal history starting from the ancient times, and when speaking at the IV Comintern congress in December 1922 he demanded of Communist party members to leave Masonic lodges. [243]
If we attempt to describe how different people not aware of the backstage hidden motives perceive the testimonials of CC members given by V. Lenin in his «Address to the convention» we shall see that they see completely different things as being significant in that address.
That J.V. Stalin is sometimes rude, has the guts not to follow «high society manners» was significant (and is still significant) for representatives of the carelessly babbling intelligentsia among the party ranks and of the leaders who have an intellectual background or have joined intelligentsia while working as professional revolutionaries. They prefer the party leaders to be intelligent talkers like themselves.
But among the common people who are busy doing real vital work (i.e. among the party masses) rudeness was not considered to be a serious vice at the time, like it was the case among the refined intelligentsia. The common people have not paid and do not pay much attention to a man’s rudeness if this man possesses professional qualities useful for the society. The common people are usually intolerant not to rude people but to those who bully others misusing their social status or talents, and one can do this while being at the same time exquisitely polite. Had Lenin written that Stalin mocked and bullied his party comrades, people would have regarded such a warning with an utterly different degree of concern.
Bolshevist party members from among the common people paid attention to the fact that J.V. Stalin had concentrated power in his hands, i.e. he was not afraid of taking the responsibility for their common cause, that he had the qualities of a leader and administrator capable of real work. And rude words and actions do not always reflect spite, and even if they are the case, they have no serious effect… Besides, for a person to lose his temper and start being rude it takes those around him to bring the person into this condition.
One should also bear in mind that the knowledge we have of what Stalin was like in intercourse is based on the reminiscences of his contemporaries. And remember that they were often written down from third persons and were carefully selected by anti-Stalinists later. But in those years not only V. Lenin, N. Krupskaya and other party leaders had a real experience of communicating with Stalin. Therefore there could be opinions on J. Stalin’s «politeness» which were different from the view V. Lenin expressed in his «Address to the convention» and which did not become a part of the cult at the time of the 20th Convention for that very reason.
In the years of Perestroika the «fight against Stalinism» livened up, and the TV broadcast a documentary shot at the place of Stalin’s last exile in the Turukhansky territory. There was nothing underneath the concrete framework of the glass «aquarium» which once protected Stalin’s museum from rough weather. The walls were covered with writings: both condemning Stalin and asking for forgiveness for having not been able to preserve the USSR - the first bolshevist state - after he passed away.
Then they interviewed an old woman, an inhabitant of that village, who remembered Stalin’s living there in exile. She was asked, «What do you remember?» When she heard the question, youth lit up her eyes, and she answered: «He was a kind man. He treated ill people with herbs…»
Thus it seems that J.V. Stalin behaved differently with different people, depending on what those people were like, what their inside was like, and what J.V. Stalin himself thought them to be…
As a result, the Bolsheviks of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) seconded J.V. Stalin and not anyone else as the party leader, judging from the testimonials given to the «leaders» by V. Lenin and from their personal experience of speaking and working with leaders.
Thus both the «world backstage» and Bolsheviks in Russia itself concurred that comrade Joseph Stalin could be entrusted the task of leadership in the cause of building socialism in a separate country. Yet under socialism the «world backstage» and Bolsheviks meant completely different, mutually exclusive ways of socially organizing people’s life. The result of those coinciding social and political processes was J. Stalin’s coming to personify bolshevist statehood in the 20th century.